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Stepping in New Directions
The Canadian Army’s Observer Program in the 
Asia-Pacific Region, 1944-45 
A N D R E W  L .  B R O W N
Abstract : In early 1944, and in anticipation of a government decision 
to commit ground forces to the war against Japan, the Canadian army 
launched a program that sent officers to the Asia-Pacific region to 
observe Allied operations.  The observer program was well underway 
when, in November 1944, the Canadian government ordered the army 
to prepare a division to serve under American command in the Pacific 
theatre.  The observer program helped the army deal with two significant 
challenges:  learning how to fight a largely unfamiliar enemy in a tropical 
environment, and learning how to operate as part of an American force. 
In early 1944, the Canadian government began to consider committing military forces to the war against Japan.1 Several 
months of deliberation ensued before the cabinet decided that 
Canada should indeed play a role in the Pacific theatre, once the 
war against Germany had concluded. That September, when Canada 
hosted the Octagon Conference of Allied leaders in Quebec City, 
Prime Minister W.L. Mackenzie King advised British and American 
authorities of Canada’s desire to contribute armed forces, including 
an army formation, to the Pacific theatre. Over the next three 
months, Canadian officials worked out what each of the services 
would commit. For the army, this amounted to a contingent of 30,000 
1  At the time, Canada already had a small presence in Southeast Asia. The RCAF’s 
413 (Coastal Reconnaissance) Squadron had been operating out of Ceylon since 
1942. Also, numerous Canadians served on attachment, on an individual basis, to 
British forces in Southeast Asia, mostly RCAF personnel serving with the RAF.
© Canadian Military History 2019
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soldiers for operations under American command. The commitment 
constituted a watershed in that it represented a first step away from 
the imperial military system. 
Ever since 1899, when Canada sent troops to South Africa, 
the dominion’s army had fought its wars alongside British forces. 
Indeed, after the Boer War, the Canadian army, like its counterparts 
in Australia and New Zealand, organised, equipped, and trained on 
the British model. Those efforts yielded compatibility that allowed 
Canadian and other dominion forces to fit into a larger British 
army in 1914, and again in 1939, creating imperial armies whose 
constituent national contingents spoke a common military language, 
shared a familiar regimental culture, used the same doctrine, and 
relied on common systems of supply.2 The 1944 decisions to send 
Canadian troops to the Pacific and to place them under American 
command, therefore, brought new and significant challenges. First, the 
Canadians needed to acquaint themselves with a largely unfamiliar 
enemy and an equally unfamiliar operating environment. Then, 
once the decision had been made to fight alongside the Americans, 
the Canadians had to figure out how to operate with US forces, 
which spoke a different military language, shared none of the same 
regimental culture, used a foreign military doctrine, and relied on a 
unique system of supply. How, then, did the Canadian army go about 
meeting these challenges? Senior Canadian officers decided that the 
army should start by stepping into the region and witnessing first-
hand how allies did business there. So, starting in early 1944, and 
until the war ended, the army sent officers to the Asia-Pacific region 
to observe Allied operations.
2  See Douglas E. Delaney, The Imperial Army Project: Britain and the Land Forces 
of the Dominions and India, 1902-1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).
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To date, the observer program has received little scholarly 
attention.3 This article explores why and how the program was run, 
addressing in four parts the question of how Canadian military 
authorities sought to prepare a ground contingent for service 
with American forces in the Pacific. The first part explains how 
the army anticipated the government’s decision to commit forces 
to the war against Japan. Until September 1944, it was not clear 
whether Canadians would be despatched to the Pacific to fight as 
part of American or British Commonwealth formations. Planning 
accordingly, Canadian military authorities took prudent action to 
prepare for all eventualities, attaching officers to American and British 
Commonwealth forces to observe combat operations in the Asia-
Pacific region. The second part explains the government’s decision 
to commit ground forces to the Pacific theatre under American 
command, situating the observer program within the strategic context 
of Canada’s war against Japan. The third part describes the observer 
program and what it accomplished. Nearly ninety officers, mostly 
captains and majors plus a few lieutenant-colonels, occupied staff 
and regimental positions and gained first-hand experience in tropical 
warfare. Responding to explicit information requirements from the 
army’s leadership, the attached officers wrote detailed reports that 
helped to build an expertise that the army badly needed. These same 
officers eventually constituted a cadre of knowledgeable individuals 
that the army could use as trainers or as staff and regimental officers. 
Finally, the last part briefly explains how the army began to raise 
a contingent for integration with US forces in the Pacific theatre. In 
short, this article describes how from early 1944 to August 1945, 
the army conducted an observer program that attached officers to 
3  C.P. Stacey briefly discusses the observers in Six Years of War: The Army in 
Canada, Britain and the Pacific (Ottawa:  Department of National Defence and the 
Queen’s Printer, 1955), 507-10. Robert Farquharson dedicates a short chapter to the 
observers who served in Southeast Asia Command, with very tactical descriptions 
of their experiences, in For Your Tomorrow: Canadians and the Burma Campaign, 
1941-1945 (Victoria: Trafford Publishing, 2004), 199-208. John Blaxland mentions 
that Canada attached officers to US and Commonwealth forces in the Pacific theatre, 
in Strategic Cousins: Australian and Canadian Expeditionary Forces and the British 
and American Empires (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 
2006), 93-94. Douglas Delaney briefly describes how in 1944-45 Canada attached 
officers to allied forces in the Pacific so that the army could gain practical experience 
before deploying a contingent to the theatre. See Delaney, The Imperial Army 
Project, 293-94. 
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allied forces in the Asia-Pacific region, to build the expertise needed 
for raising a Canadian contingent for the war against Japan, and 
to determine how best to integrate Canadian troops into whichever 
national military forces they were attached. 
the genesis of the observer program
The observer program grew out of the army’s anticipation of a 
political decision to commit forces to the war against Japan. In late 
May 1943, the head of Canada’s Joint Staff Mission in Washington, 
Major-General Maurice Pope, first proposed sending officers to 
observe Allied operations against the Japanese. After hearing 
Churchill’s guarantee to the United States Congress on 19 May 
that Britain would offer her full support in the war against Japan 
once Germany was defeated, Pope wrote to Lieutenant-General 
Kenneth Stuart, the Chief of the General Staff (CGS), to suggest 
some prudent planning. Reasoning with acute foresight that Ottawa, 
too, might eventually wish to take part in the campaign against 
Japan, Pope recommended dispatching observers to the Australian 
and New Zealand armies, a measure that he stated would “put us in 
possession of first-hand knowledge of fighting conditions in an area 
in which some day we may be called upon to fight.”4 At first, there 
was little interest or response. But five months later, when Pope 
visited Stuart in Ottawa, the latter indicated that not only might 
it be a good idea to send obsevers to the Pacific, there might even 
be merit in collaborating with the American army in the region, 
an idea that Stuart intended to explore.5 Later that month, after 
reflecting on Stuart’s comments, Pope suggested that, even though 
it might be some time before Ottawa decides to fight in the Pacific, 
the Canadian army should observe upcoming US operations. “[O]ur 
Army”, as Pope put it, “has no experience what[so]ever in fighting 
in tropical regions.” Pope proposed attaching a group of observers 
to American army units and formations, not just to Commonwealth 
4  Library and Archives Canada (LAC), MG 27 IIIF4 vol. 1, Pope to CGS, 24 May 
1943.
5  Government of Canada, Department of National Defence, Directorate of History 
and Heritage (DHH), 314.009 (D51) Cdn Army Observers (May 43-Nov 44), Pope 
to CGS, 5 November 1943.
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formations as he had previously suggested. Such an effort, “would 
gain us valuable experience which might well stand us in good stead 
in the days [and decisions] to come.”6
Pope’s prodding proved effective. In early January 1944, the new 
CGS, John Murchie, accepted his recommendations and proposed 
to the Cabinet War Committee that Canada send two groups of 
officers to observe Allied operations against Japanese forces. The 
first group would be drawn from the Canadian Army Overseas (the 
expeditionary force in Europe), which would send officers to train and 
deploy with British or dominion forces in the South West Pacific and 
South East Asia. The second group, drawn from the home army in 
Canada, would join Australian, New Zealand, and American forces 
in the South West Pacific to participate in training and operations.
6  Ibid.
Australian troops return from a patrol, New Guinea, November 1943.  Anticipating a decision 
from Ottawa to participate in the war against Japan, Canadian army officials considered that 
Canadian troops ought to learn from their Commonwealth cousins about operating in the 
Pacific region. [Australian War Memorial 016195]
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The Cabinet War Committee accepted Murchie’s 
recommendations.7 Within days, the army received authority to 
attach soldiers to British Commonwealth and American forces in the 
Asian and Pacific theatres, although the committee emphasized that 
the deployments implied no government intent to commit forces to 
these regions. Military officials wasted no time. They immediately 
worked with the War Office to attach twenty officers to South East 
Asia Command (SEAC), mostly to the Fourteenth Army in Burma.8 
Meanwhile, Murchie directed Pope to initiate discussions with the 
US War Department and with the Australian and New Zealand 
military missions to do the same with their formations in the South 
West Pacific Area (SWPA). Murchie wanted ten officers to join the 
American forces, eight to join the Australian army, and two to join 
New Zealand’s army. These twenty officers would train with Allied 
formations as they prepared for operations, followed by employment 
in deployed units and formations, for a total of four to six months. 
Most of the observers would be captains or majors, although a few 
could be lieutenant-colonels with staff experience.9 Within days, Pope 
confirmed that he had made the requests to the Australian and New 
Zealand military missions.  He also consulted with General George 
C. Marshall, the US Army Chief of Staff, who “saw no reason why 
our request could not be met” and who promised an official reply 
shortly.10 Marshall was good to his word. He soon advised Pope that 
the War Department supported Canada’s request, and he proposed 
that the Canadian officers first proceed to Hawaii to attend division-
level jungle and amphibious training, after which they could join 
units proceeding on active operations.11 The other allies were just as 
quick to help out. Australia advised that it could immediately take on 
the eight officers that the Canadians proposed for attachment, and 
New Zealand indicated that it would “gladly accept” two Canadian 
7  Ibid., Cabinet War Committee minutes, 12 January 1944, http://heritage.
canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.lac_reel_c4876/111?r=0&s=4 (accessed 23 June 2017).
8  Canada, Department of National Defence, Directorate of History and Heritage 
(DHH), Army Headquarters Historical Section Report No. 16, 15 July 1947 (this 
document, including Amendments No. 1 and 2, dated 7 January 1953, referred to 
hereafter as AHQ Report No. 16).
9  DHH, 314.009 (D51) Cdn Army Observers (May 43-Nov 44), CGS to Pope, 5 
February 1944. 
10  Ibid., Pope to CGS, 10 February 1944.
11  Ibid., General G.C. Marshall to Pope, 12 February 44.
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officers, who would be attached to the 3rd New Zealand Division.12 
By 4 March 1944, the army had selected officers and began to deploy 
them to their respective to British, Australian, New Zealand, and 
American formations.
the political decision to commit forces to the pacific 
theatre
Meanwhile, during the first eight months of 1944, the Canadian 
government deliberated on what the Canadian army should do in the 
war against Japan and with whom it should do it. In January, the 
prime minister expressed in his diary a belief that Canada had an 
obligation to share the burden of fighting Japan, even if the public, 
12  Ibid., Pope to Cdn Army Staff, 21 February 1944.
The Asia-Pacific Theatre.
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outside of British Columbia, would not be enthusiastic.13 Canada 
might also have to help defeat Japan to maintain standing with 
both the United States and Britain.14 Canadian participation, as 
far as King saw it, was about buttressing the nation’s reputation 
as a dependable ally, and not about any requirement for Canadian 
military assistance. No one was requesting help from Ottawa. Indeed, 
when King discussed the Pacific theatre with Pope seven months 
later, the general advised that any Canadian contribution should 
be made only for political reasons because “Canadian participation 
or non-participation would have no effect on the Pacific war.”15 In 
fact, Pope told King, Canada was “neither being asked nor were we 
wanted to take part in the fight against Japan.” Still, by September, 
the government was committed to sending something to the Pacific, 
although it was not yet certain what they would send or with whom.
 The latter decision was made mostly for reasons of national 
interest. The Canadian War Cabinet’s decision to fight with the 
Americans was a departure from tradition, given the long practice of 
attaching Canadian formations to British forces. In fact, the army’s 
reflexive impulse was to join the British campaign in Sou th East 
Asia. In June 1944, when the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee 
first considered potential contributions to the war against Japan, the 
CGS defaulted instinctively to tradition, suggesting that “it might 
be logical to send a Canadian force to serve with the British in 
South East Asia” once the war in Europe had ended.16 However, as 
even the service chiefs noted, “the natural tendency for Canadian 
forces to be employed in combination with British forces” would mean 
operating this time in a region of no importance to Ottawa. Canada 
had no interests in places like Burma or Singapore, but it did have 
an interest in maintaining good relations with the United States. So, 
despite close Commonwealth ties and decades of imperial military 
conditioning, national interest drove the decision as to where, and 
with whom, Canada ought to send her ground troops. In August 
13  W.L.M. King, The Diaries of William Lyon Mackenzie King, entry for 5 January 
1944, Library and Archives Canada, http://www.bac-lac.gc.ca/eng/discover/
politics-government/prime-ministers/william-lyon-mackenzie-king/Pages/search.
aspx, (accessed 05 May 2017). Referred to hereafter as King diary.
14  King diary, 12 January 1944.  
15  LAC, MG 27 IIIF4 vol. 1 Maurice Arthur Pope fonds, Pope diary, 30 August 1944.
16  DHH, 112.3M2009 (D79), Extracts from Minutes of 289th Meeting of Chiefs of 
Staff Committee, 7 June 1944.
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1944, after having considered the matter in greater detail, Murchie 
advised Minister of National Defence James Ralston that, if the 
government committed ground forces to the war against Japan, they 
should go to the North Pacific. Murchie offered several reasons. To 
start, the Canadians could fight there without the jungle training 
required for operations in South East Asia or the South West 
Pacific. For reasons of prestige relative to the defeat at Hong Kong, 
Canadian troops should be part of the occupation of the Japanese 
homeland. And by the time Canadian forces could be ready to deploy, 
operations in South East Asia and the South West Pacific would 
likely be in the final consolidation phase, leaving only garrison duties 
for newcomers to perform, a dull chore that would hardly enhance 
Canadian standing. And finally, as a Pacific nation with interests in 
the North Pacific region, it would be good for Canada to be seen as 
having made a meaningful contribution there. Contributing directly 
to Japan’s defeat could help open post war markets for Canada in 
Japan and China.17
The prime minister and the cabinet evidently accepted this 
rationale. King also considered that large segments of the Canadian 
public, particularly in French-speaking Canada, would likely perceive 
any plan to send the army to India, Burma or Singapore as slavish 
support for British imperial wars, which could pose problems for the 
Liberal government during the next election. In any event, and as King 
well knew, even the British believed that the final fighting against 
Japan would be in the North or Central Pacific, while the Americans 
derisively regarded efforts to reclaim Singapore and Burma as but “a 
side-show to save the British prestige.”18 It was clear in Ottawa, then, 
that the army should fight in the North or Central Pacific, which 
meant operating in an American theatre.
Of course, Canada still consulted with British authorities before 
finally deciding what sort of contribution to offer. There was no need 
to incur unnecessary enmity, after all. On 27 June 1944, King advised 
Churchill that the Cabinet War Committee was leaning towards a 
deployment to the North Pacific.19 At the same time, the Canadian 
Joint Staff Mission in London submitted to the British chiefs of 
17  Ibid., CGS to Minister of National Defence, 19 August 1944.
18  King diary, 13 September 1944.
19  DHH, 112.3M2009 (D79), telegram from the Secretary of State for External Affairs 
(Ottawa) to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs (London), 27 June 1944.
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staff a list of questions regarding how the war might progress after 
Germany’s defeat. In response, the British cabinet’s Joint Planning 
Staff produced an aide memoire that suggested deployment options for 
the dominion’s forces after victory in Europe.20 The British signalled 
that the war against Japan would probably continue for some time. 
In fact, they calculated, one full year after the defeat of Germany, 70 
per cent of Britain’s armed forces would still be needed to fight the 
Japanese. Any Canadian contribution would be “most welcome in 
view of the severe strain on British manpower” and perhaps Canada 
should commit two divisions.21 Operations in the North Pacific, the 
British counselled, could begin in the summer of 1945 and, therefore, 
Canada should, as soon as possible, concentrate at home whatever 
forces it would commit so that they could prepare for operations 
while the government decided where exactly they should be sent.  
That made sense, but the Canadians had their own motivations 
for deploying forces to the Pacific and came to their own conclusions. 
On 23 August, the CGS and the minister of national defence 
recommended to the Cabinet War Committee that any Canadian 
commitment should be designed to make a “fair and reasonable 
contribution based on Canadian capabilities” relative to British 
and American efforts, and not just to alleviate British manpower 
problems. Canadian troops, they argued, should operate in the North 
Pacific, which had geographic and political relevance to Canada, and 
they should definitely participate in the final assault on the Japanese 
homeland “as a means of avenging Hong Kong and restoring Canadian 
military prestige in the Far East.” The force should comprise one 
division (with ancillary troops and reinforcements), not two as the 
British had proposed, because a division was the minimum-size 
contingent that could operate as a self-contained formation and 
remain visible as a distinct Canadian contribution. On 6 September, 
the Cabinet War Committee formally decided that Canada should 
indeed participate in the fight against Japan, with forces operating in 
20  Ibid., Summary—Aide Memoire on the Employment of Canadian Forces After the 
Defeat of Germany, 5 August 1944.
21  Ibid., Submission to Cabinet War Committee on Canadian Army Participation in 
the Pacific War and in the Army of Occupation in Germany, 23 August 1944.
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the North or Central Pacific regions.22 Before the government made 
any commitments, however, final consultation with Britain would 
occur at the executive level, led personally by King, who decided to 
discuss Canada’s thinking with Churchill.  
The nature of the Canadian contingent was worked out amicably 
during the Octagon Conference in Quebec City. On 14 September, 
the Cabinet War Committee and the service chiefs of staff met with 
Churchill to discuss potential Canadian contributions. The Chief of 
the Imperial General Staff, Sir Alan Brooke, and the British service 
chiefs of staff also attended.23  The Canadians told the British prime 
22  LAC, RG 2, vol. 5682, reel c-4876, Cabinet War Committee memorandum: 
Employment of Canadian Forces after European Hostilities, 13 September 1944, 
http://heritage.canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.lac_reel_c4876/1133?r=0&s=3 
(accessed 08 June 2017).
23  King diary, 14 September 1944. Maurice Pope, who as King’s new military staff 
officer was present, records the attendance of the British service chiefs in Soldiers 
and Politicians: The Memoirs of Lt-Gen. Maurice A. Pope (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1962), 242.
Winston Churchill and W. L. Mackenzie King with Canadian cabinet ministers during the 
Octagon Conference, Quebec, September 1944. [Library and Archives Canada/William Lyon 
Mackenzie King fonds/c071095]
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minister what Canada had in mind, namely to contribute to operations 
in the North and Central Pacific, as far south as the Philippines, 
but explicitly not in India, Burma, or Singapore. Churchill reacted 
with indifference. He certainly desired no Canadian ground forces 
for British operations in South East Asia, not in late 1944 or 1945 
anyway. The British campaign in Burma had turned favourably after 
the defensive battles of Imphal and Kohima earlier in the year, and 
the badly weakened Japanese army was withdrawing under strong 
British pressure. According to King’s diary, “Churchill made it quite 
clear [that] there was no need for our Army at all in the Southern 
Pacific”. The British prime minister was quite in agreement that 
Canada should contribute a token force to the war against Japan 
but stated that nothing more would be necessary. British disinterest 
in a substantial Canadian contingent for South East Asia aligned 
with Canadian disinterest in that particular region. Churchill had 
no problem with a Canadian contingent under American command 
either, although he did say that “he would have to speak to the 
President about the possibility of [Canada] making any contribution 
with the army.” Even Britain, Churchill advised, was experiencing 
difficulty in obtaining American agreement to participation in the 
Pacific because “there [was] only a limited number of ‘front seats’ for 
the Japanese war.”24 The next day, the Canadian CGS, John Murchie, 
and Pope met with Marshall to present proposals on Canadian army 
contributions in the Pacific.25
The Americans accepted the idea of Canadian participation in 
principle. During an impromptu discussion with Roosevelt at Quebec, 
King indicated that his government was prepared to commit forces to 
the war against Japan. According to King’s diary, the president replied 
that Canada “should have a token representation but indicated that 
nothing might be needed for some time.” 26 And during the second 
plenary meeting of the Octagon Conference (attended by Roosevelt, 
Churchill, their top armed forces advisors, and the British secretary 
of state for foreign affairs), Churchill announced that Canada was 
seeking assurance in principle that its forces could participate in 
24  The National Archives (TNA) (United Kingdom), PREM 3/329/6, Octagon 
Conference Meeting with Canadian War Cabinet Committee 14 September 1944.  
25  Ibid., 242.
26  King diary, 14 September 1944.  
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operations against Japan, preferably in the North Pacific region.27 
The attendees agreed that such assurance should be given, although 
it was never a sure thing. Pope later recorded in his memoir that 
Commonwealth participation in the American-controlled Pacific 
theatre “proved to be the Conference’s most contentious item”, as 
the British chiefs of staff insisted, in the face of some American 
opposition, that they were determined to avenge Japan’s aggression.28 
In the end, the Americans agreed, the final report of the conference 
noting simply that “Canadian participation is accepted in principle.”29
 The Canadian government still had to weigh a few more 
considerations before it could formally commit ground forces to the 
Pacific theatre. The Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) and Royal 
Canadian Navy proposals for Pacific operations required work, which 
took some time, as did plans for the eventual occupation of Germany. 
The finance minister also had to figure out how the government 
would pay for all of it during the fiscal year 1945-1946. Consequently, 
two months passed before Ottawa was able to authorize a division 
for service in the Pacific.30 But, finally, on 20 November, the Cabinet 
War Committee ordered the army’s participation in the war against 
Japan. As proposed, a ground contingent comprised of one division 
with ancillary troops and reinforcements, for a total of up to 30,000 
troops, would operate under American command and be organized 
and equipped in accordance with American tables of organization.31  
27  LAC, RG 24, vol. 20324, Record of Proceedings for the Quebec Conference 
(September 1944), 6.
28  Pope, Memoirs, 243-44.
29  Ibid., 80.
30  LAC, RG 2, vol. 5682, reel c-4876, minutes for Cabinet War Committee meetings, 
22 September 1944, 5 October 1944, and 20 October 1944, http://heritage.canadiana.
ca/view/oocihm.lac_reel_c4876/852?r=0&s=5 & http://heritage.canadiana.ca/
view/oocihm.lac_reel_c4876/883?r=0&s=5& http://heritage.canadiana.ca/view/
oocihm.lac_reel_c4876/913?r=0&s=5 (accessed 8 June 2017).
31  DHH, 112.3M2009 (D79), Summary of Cabinet Decisions Regarding Canadian 
Pacific Force, undated.  On 11 October, the government approved the navy’s 
contribution, which was to include a variety of ships, from corvettes up to light fleet 
carriers and cruisers, manned by 13,412 personnel. This contingent was to serve with 
the Royal Navy in the Central Pacific. On 11 December, the government approved 
the RCAF contingent, which was to comprise twenty-two squadrons and operate 
with the RAF in the Pacific. C.P. Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments: the War 
Policies of Canada, 1939-1945 (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1970), 60. Also, LAC, 
RG 2, vol. 5682, reel C-4876, Cabinet War Committee minutes, 11 December 1944 
http://heritage.canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.lac_reel_c4876/947?r=0&s=3 (accessed 
27 June 2017).
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By the end of November 1944, then, it was clear that the army 
faced two major challenges. The first was preparing to fight a largely 
unfamiliar enemy in equally unfamiliar terrain and climate conditions. 
Notwithstanding the gallant but hopeless defence of Hong Kong in 
December 1941, the Canadian army had no experience fighting the 
Japanese. Clearly, it had to gain corporate knowledge of Japanese 
tactics and equipment, as well as their strengths and weaknesses 
relative to its own forces. The Canadians had to learn how to fight 
in the climate and terrain of the Pacific region, plain and simple. 
Planners also had to consider how well suited Canadian equipment 
was for the theatre, what kit should be shed and what had to be 
Japanese troops land off the west coast of British North Borneo, January 1941. Canadian military 
officials recognized as early as May 1943 that the Canadian army should increase its familiarity 
with Japanese forces and with the Asia-Pacific theatre. [Australian War Memorial 127907]
14
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procured, how tactical sustainment would occur, how the medical 
system should be tailored to local conditions, how to contend with 
Pacific-theatre wastage rates, and countless other details.
The army’s second major challenge was figuring out how to 
integrate a division into the American military system. After all, 
the American military differed from the British army, the mould in 
which the Canadian army had been deliberately cast. For example, 
American forces used a dissimilar staff structure. Whereas Canadian 
staffs were structured on the British model, with G (operations and 
intelligence), A (personnel administration), and Q (quartermaster/
logistics) branches, the Americans used the continental system 
of numbered branches—G1 (personnel), G2 (intelligence), G3 
(operations) and G4 (logistics). The two armies also used different 
terminology. Canadians used “war establishments” to describe the 
constitution of units and formations, while Americans used “tables 
of organization and equipment” (TO&E). What Canadians called 
an infantry brigade, the Americans called an infantry regiment. 
Furthermore, Canada maintained a different system of non-
commissioned ranks that did not equate cleanly with the American 
December 1943. US soldiers aboard landing craft prepare for disembarkation as they approach 
the inhospitable shores near Arawe, New Britain. With Ottawa’s decision to commit a ground 
contingent to fight under American command, planners had to figure out how to integrate a 
Canadian division into the unfamiliar American military system. [Australian War Memorial 016329]
15
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rank structure. Command arrangements would have to be worked 
out too. Would American and Canadian officers be empowered to 
issue legally binding orders to subordinate soldiers in each other’s 
militaries? Would disciplinary powers be granted? Should measures 
be established to ensure an American commander could not compel a 
Canadian formation to conduct an operation that Ottawa would not 
approve? Canada, the other dominions, and Britain had long since 
settled amongst themselves such matters of interoperability, at first 
simply through conventions formed over years of cooperation and, 
after 1933, with “Visiting Forces” legislation that formally articulated 
command relationships when forces of the British Empire operated 
together. Significantly, the countries’ reciprocal Visiting Forces 
Acts confirmed that national contingent commanders had the right 
to refer orders to their governments, a vital provision for ensuring 
that contingents could not be forced to act outside of their nations’ 
interests.32 But Canada had no such standing arrangements with the 
United States. These interoperability issues and myriad other details 
had to be identified and reconciled if a Canadian formation was to 
integrate efficiently into the American system.
In fact, at the time, Canada’s Australian cousins were experiencing 
challenges integrating their army with American forces in the 
South West Pacific Area (SWPA), under the supreme command of 
General Douglas MacArthur, partly because the armies had different 
cultures, structures, and methods, and partly because of MacArthur’s 
reluctance to integrate foreign forces with American troops. For 
example, incompatible supply systems caused friction between the 
two armies. After the campaign in Papua, American planners felt 
that they should not rely on a mixed American-Australian supply 
system, which had proven unsuited to American requirements and 
practices.33 Also, when in April 1942 MacArthur assumed the position 
of Supreme Commander SWPA, he refused to allow any Australian 
officers to serve in his headquarters’ senior staff billets.34 Then, in 
32  Britain passed its Visiting Forces Act in 1933. Canada and South Africa passed 
reciprocal legislation later that year, and Australia and New Zealand passed Visiting 
Forces Acts in 1939. Delaney, The Imperial Army Project, 198.
33  Jeffrey Grey, The Australian Army (South Melbourne, Australia: Oxford 
University Press, 2001), 142.
34  On Australian frictions with American forces in SWPA, see Gavin Long The Final 
Campaigns (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1963), Appendix 1 (Command 
Problems, S.W.P.A. 1942-1945), 590-99.
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February 1943, he placed under his direct command all American 
ground forces (Task Force Alamo), ensuring that the SWPA’s Allied 
Land Forces component, which was commanded by Australian 
General Sir Thomas Blamey, included no American formations. From 
1944 to 1945, American and Australian armies operated in widely 
separate areas, with American forces receiving abundant supplies 
while Australian troops were left wanting for many essentials. Such 
a situation would not likely have occurred, had MacArthur taken 
senior Australian officers on his staff. Naturally, the short shrift given 
Australian ground forces caused animosity, not the least with Blamey. 
Such issues had implications for Canada. Clearly, the Canadian 
army had to make every effort to integrate smoothly and efficiently 
with the Americans. But while working with the Americans brought 
challenges, the Canadian army’s senior leadership saw those 
challenges coming. As early as 27 May 1943, Pope recorded that he 
had learned from Lieutenant-General Vernon Sturdee, the chief of 
Australia’s military mission in Washington, that “the Australians 
no longer owned their own country, implying, of course, that the 
US Army is in charge.”35 Sturdee also informed Pope that General 
Douglas MacArthur maintained “a distinct anti-British bias”, which 
may have indicated a distaste for the British army standards adhered 
to in the Dominion armies. There were no real surprises when it 
came to problems of interoperability with the Americans. By the 
time the government was ready in September 1944 to signal Canada’s 
desire to join the fight against Japan, the army had for months been 
collecting information to help planners make it happen.
preparing the army for the war Against japan: the 
observer program
The observer program commenced in early 1944, shortly after 
the Canadian government first floated the idea of sending troops 
to fight Japan. Before they departed for the Asia-Pacific region, 
the observers received detailed instructions on what they were to 
learn and gather. For the officers joining American forces, their 
orders emphasized not only collecting information about the Pacific 
theatre, but also information relevant to preparing a Canadian 
35  LAC, MG 27 IIIF4 vol. 1, War Diary entry for 27 May 1943.
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contingent for operations alongside US forces and, accordingly, how 
Canadian organization and equipment should be modified.36 Each 
officer was to “observe closely the functions of his own special arm 
in all its phases”, paying close attention to methods of training and 
conditioning soldiers for the Pacific theatre, tactics employed in the 
theatre’s unique terrain types (“jungle, hilly and mountainous, coral 
islands”), and the planning and conduct of amphibious operations. 
In addition, all officers were to observe the maintenance of forces, 
such as how the Americans sustained units with ammunition, 
fuel, and supplies, and how US forces tailored medical plans to 
the environment. Those observers with staff training were also to 
pay close attention to unique American staff procedures. Finally, 
the instructions directed the observers to submit written reports 
consisting of two parts, “common to all arms” and “special to arms”, 
the latter to include detailed information on training. Observers 
employed as staff officers were also to include a third section on staff 
considerations. All were to submit reports after the training period, 
and again after operational employment.  
The observer program certainly met the goal of providing the 
Canadian army with a compendium of up-to-date knowledge and 
lessons from the campaign against Japan. The first observers left 
for the Pacific theatre in late February 1944, when ten officers 
joined the 27th US Infantry Division at Hawaii for three months of 
training, as Marshall had proposed. Then, in June, they sailed with 
the division when it deployed to support the United States Marine 
Corps (USMC) in the Mariana Islands, and they participated in 
operations at Saipan. From there, two officers returned to Canada—
one with dengue fever—while the remainder continued on to the 
South West Pacific Area for operations in New Guinea.37 As directed, 
the observers transmitted their hard-won knowledge back to army 
planners by submitting detailed reports. These submissions provided 
the army with testimonial accounts of Japanese tactics, the challenges 
of operating in the Asia-Pacific theatre, and how the allies prepared 
their forces for operations. Individual reports gradually made their 
way back to Canada where the army collated them. Several groups 
36  DHH, 314.009 (D51) Cdn Army Observers (Nov 44-Jul 45), Memorandum to 
Officers Proceeding on Attachment to US Forces of Pacific Ocean Areas or Southwest 
Pacific Area, 5 January 1945.
37  AHQ Report No. 16.
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of officers also produced joint reports with concise, informative 
descriptions of particular regions or campaigns. While it is impossible 
and unnecessary to condense here the rich body of expertise the 
observers produced, it is worthwhile to describe, at least in broad 
strokes, the type of knowledge they captured.
The first group of attachments to American forces produced a very 
useful joint report on their observations and experiences during the 
battle of Saipan.38 Their thirty-six-page statement, plus appendices, 
contained a wealth of information that army planners would have 
surely found helpful.  The report discussed in detail the tactical 
environment and how Canadian equipment and practices in such 
conditions would either be sufficient or require adjustment. Regarding 
equipment, for example, the officers used both American and 
Canadian boots and determined that the latter were better. Standard 
Canadian wool socks, worn continuously for days at a time, performed 
better than US light wool or cotton socks. Personal insect nets were 
essential, as were two water bottles per soldier, and the US canteen 
and canteen cup were far superior to the Canadian water bottle and 
could easily be fit to Canadian web gear. The Canadian anklet was 
“worthless.” The observers also recommended getting rid of Canadian 
entrenching tools and ground sheets (they “would be entirely useless”) 
and replacing them with the US model-1943 entrenching tool and the 
USMC poncho. And while the Americans had no equivalent to the 
Canadian army’s Bren Universal Carrier—a vehicle that would have 
proven useful in Saipan for ferrying ammunition to soldiers under 
fire—Canadian battalions, the observers recommended, should outfit 
some of their carriers with flame throwers, an essential weapon for 
the theatre. For training, the observers collectively agreed “that all 
the drills as taught at the Canadian School of Infantry could be 
used to good advantage against the Jap[ane]s[e]”. The report also 
discussed in detail, amongst other things, American tactics and 
how various arms supported the infantry, and the employment of 
reconnaissance troops, artillery, and communications. Authorities in 
Canada received the Saipan report with enthusiasm, reproducing and 
distributing it to all lieutenants-colonel in Canada holding command 
positions “so that the excellent lessons brought out may be applied 
38  DHH, 322.009 Observers Reports on CWPA Attachments 1944-45, Report of 
Canadian Officers Attached to 27th Infantry Division, United States Army, for the 
Saipan Operation, 15 June to 9 July 1944, dated 28 September 44.
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where indicated to tr[ainin]g” and “to get all off[ice]rs thinking about 
possible future op[eration]s in the Pacific.”39 
Indeed, the observer program proved so worthwhile that Ottawa 
soon expanded it and continued to collect useful information. By late 
November, when the first-deployed group of observer officers returned 
to Canada, the army wanted to attach another thirty officers to 
American forces in the Pacific.40 This time, Canada arranged with the 
US Army to send three groups of ten officers, departing in one-month 
intervals, for a month of training and two months of operational duty. 
Each group consisted of captains and majors, led by a lieutenant-
colonel.41  The first group participated in landings on the Zamboanga 
Peninsula (Mindanao Island), and on 9 April 1945 took part in 
landings in the Sulu Archipelago.42 The second and third groups were 
39  Ibid., Report of Canadian Officers Attached to 27th Infantry Division, Saipan Cdn 
Report, undated.
40  DHH, 314.009 (D51) Cdn Army Observers (Nov 44-Jul 45), Colonel A.J. Creighton 
(for CGS) to Commander Canadian Army Staff in Washington, 28 November 1944.
41  Ibid., Letson to Marshall, 30 November 1944.
42  AHQ Report No. 16.
Observer Deployment Locations.
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attached to formations of the 10th US Army. They participated in 
the assault on Okinawa, with seven officers attached to the USMC’s 
III Amphibious Corps,43 ten officers to the US Army’s XXIV Corps, 
and three to the 2nd Marine Division.44 These latter three profited 
from opportunities to study staff branches—two studied “G1, G2, G3 
(our A, I and G)”, and one studied “G4 (our Q and Ord[nance])”.45
Once again the observers fed useful recommendations back to 
army headquarters. For example, Major R.R. Munroe reported that 
American forces had learned to deal with problematic Japanese 
pill boxes by deploying smoke to cover the forward movement of 
tanks that, once close enough, could engage with flamethrowers.46 
In fact, he noted, the Marine divisions had replaced the .50 calibre 
bow guns in their Sherman tanks with flamethrowers. Furthermore, 
the Americans did not normally use tanks en masse in the Pacific 
theatre, choosing instead to use armour mainly in direct support of the 
infantry. American infantry tactics closely approximated Canadian 
practices, although the Marines found it necessary to concentrate 
machine guns very far forward, especially when consolidating at 
night, to stop enemy infiltration and mass suicide attacks. Also, if 
the Canadian army decided to adopt American infantry weapons—
which Munro recommended, so that the American supply system 
could be used—it would take two to three weeks for Canadian troops 
to master using them. As for staff organization, Munro reported, the 
Canadian system should be adapted to its American counterpart, 
merely by renaming the sections and possibly by adding a chief of 
staff or assistant division commander who could step up to command 
in the event the division commander became a casualty.47 That was 
all well and good, but Canadian military authorities felt compelled to 
send more officers for staff training in the United States. In all, some 
sixteen Canadian officers passed through American staff schools for 
training on operations in the Pacific.48
43  Two of these officers were subsequently wounded in action.
44  Ibid.
45  DHH 171.009 (D137), Major R.R. Munro, Report on Attachment to US Armed 
Forces Pacific Ocean Areas 27 Feb – 9 Jun 45, undated.
46  Ibid., Major R.R. Munroe, Report on Attachment to US Armed Forces, 9 June 
1945.
47  Ibid.
48  AHQ Report No.16.
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In mid-March 1945, Canada arranged to send one last batch 
of observers to American forces in the Pacific. That month, the 
army made a third and final request to the War Department to 
accept Canadian officers on attachment. This time, Canada wanted 
to send five staff officers and ten regimental officers. The War 
Department agreed to accommodate the staff officers at the end of 
April and the regimental officers in early June.49 The five staff officers 
proceeded to Okinawa in May, where fighting was ongoing. They 
visited several formations and produced detailed reports on American 
staff procedure. In June, the ten regimental officers also deployed 
to Okinawa, where they joined units of the 10th Army. One of the 
officers, Captain J.E. Hilliker of the Intelligence Corps, was injured 
while participating in an attempt to capture a Japanese general and 
his staff.50 When these officers concluded their tours, the army had a 
cohort of fifty-five officers with experience operating with American 
units and formations.
49  DHH, 314.009 (D51) Cdn Army Observers (Nov 44-Jul 45), Brigadier-General 
A.J. McFarland to Letson, 28 March 1945.
50  AHQ Report No. 16.
New Guinea, March 1944.  Australian troops demonstrate how to cross a fast-moving river 
by forming a human chain with their rifles. Ten Canadian officers deployed to New Guinea 
in mid-1944 to participate in operations with the 5th Australian Division. [Australian War 
Memorial  016720]
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The officers on attachment to the New Zealand and Australian 
armies gained valuable experience too. In mid-March 1944, two 
officers departed for Nisson Island (the Green Islands) for service 
with the 3rd New Zealand Division. But, when the division was 
withdrawn and slated for disbandment, they soon found themselves 
moving on to join eight other Canadians on attachment with the 6th 
Australian Division.51 In June, all ten officers flew to New Guinea 
where they joined brigades of the 5th Australian Division for about a 
month of mopping-up operations.  They returned to Australia in July 
and participated in training with the 6th and 9th Divisions.  Shortly 
after, they availed themselves of an opportunity to acquire combat 
experience with a party of Australian observers joining US forces. 
In September, with their Australian colleagues, the ten Canadians 
reported to the American Trade Winds Task Force at New Guinea, 
where they joined units of the 3rd US Infantry Division in time to 
51  Ibid., and DHH, 314.009 (D51) Cdn Army Observers (May 43-Nov 44), Canadian 
Joint Staff Washington message, 18 April 1944.
New Guinea, 6 September 1944.  Canadian observers with the Australian and American forces 
in the Pacific area. On the left is Captain R.M. Baldwin, Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light 
Infantry.  On the right, Captain L. Archibald, the Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment) of 
Canada. [Australian War Memorial 075673]
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participate in operations on Morotai Island. The party returned to 
Canada in November.52
Meanwhile, the officers sent to British forces in South East 
Asia Command gained experience fighting the Japanese in Burma’s 
exceptionally difficult jungle conditions. Their orders emphasized 
that they were to collect information “of great benefit” to any future 
operations the army might undertake against Japan.53 They were to 
produce reports periodically, as circumstances allowed, but preferably 
on a monthly basis, and submit them directly to Canadian Military 
Headquarters in London. The army was particularly interested in 
how training in South East Asia Command differed from Canadian 
practices and called for information on special weapons and equipment, 
jungle tactics, conditioning programs, and physical fitness regimes. 
The observers were also to pay attention to factors of interest for 
each arm of the army, and to advise on administrative points relevant 
to future planning. Finally, the instructions encouraged officers to 
provide narrative accounts of the operations they participated in. 
This group of twenty officers, which later expanded to twenty-
three,54 deployed from July 1944 to January 1945 under the leadership 
of Lieutenant-Colonel George Spencer (a permanent force combat 
engineer who retired in 1971 as a major-general). Their deployment 
occurred during three months of monsoon conditions and over two 
months of dry season. Upon arrival in India, the officers dispersed 
to various training units for a month of acclimatization and theatre 
indoctrination. Then, they spent four months in Burma serving in 
units and formations of the 15th Indian Corps, 14th Army. To conclude 
their tour, the officers visited units in India for three weeks.55 While 
on operations in Burma, they performed a wide range of duties.56 
52  AHQ Report No. 16.
53  DHH, Robert H. Farquharson fonds, box 3, Duncanson file, Lieutenant-General 
Stuart to officers proceeding on attachment to SEAC, 7 June 1944.
54  Two infantry lieutenants joined the tour in mid-August, and one infantry major 
arrived in India in mid-November and remained in theatre until mid-April 1945. 
DHH, 171.009 (D51), Consolidated Report of Canadian Army Officers Attached to 
South East Asia Command, Appendix A, 12 February 1945.
55  DHH, 171.009 (D51), Consolidated Report of Canadian Army Officers Attached to 
South East Asia Command, 12 February 1945 (referred to hereafter as Consolidated 
SEAC Report). Also, DHH Robert H. Farquharson fonds, Major-General (retired) 
George Spencer to Robert Farquharson, 20 November 2001.
56  The reports can be found in DHH, 171.009 (D51). The Duncanson report is in the 
Farquharson fonds.
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For example, Spencer served in the 11th East African Division as 
the formation’s administration staff officer;  Major C.V.B. Corbet 
served in the headquarters of the 123rd Indian Infantry Brigade, 
where he was responsible for coordinating tactical air support; Major 
A.A. Duncanson served with the 4th battalion of the Royal West 
Kent regiment on operations, and for about ten days commanded a 
company after the sub-unit’s commander was wounded in battle, and 
later acted as the unit’s second-in-command for a week; Captain M.N. 
Bow served as a company second-in-command with the 9th battalion 
of the York and Lancaster Regiment during combat operations, and 
later served with the 6th battalion of the “Oxford and Bucks” Light 
Infantry on the Arakan front; Captain E.H.A. Carson was attached 
to the 302 Field Regiment for operations on the Chindwin Front; 
and so on. Of course, by the time these officers returned to Canada 
in January 1945, the government had committed to attaching the 
Canadian contingent to American forces. Nonetheless, the officers 
believed that they had captured information that would be useful 
to the army’s future efforts, noting in their collective post-tour 
statement that “Although the Report has been produced as a result 
of experience in SOUTH EAST ASIA COMMAND it is felt that the 
majority of the points raised apply equally to other Theatres of War 
where the JAPANESE Enemy is to be found.”57
Canadian Military Headquarters in London, which received 
individual reports from the officers attached to South East Asia 
Command, consolidated the most relevant findings into a report 
called the CMHQ Far Eastern Warfare Digest. For example, Digest 
No. 3, produced in February 1945, focused on the planning and 
conduct of tropical operations. It provided narrative accounts of the 
tactical challenges of operating in the jungle environment, and lent 
insight into administrative considerations that probably seemed novel 
to Canadian planners. The report showed, for instance, that mules 
were essential for transport services and that units had detailed 
animal allotments (although one respects that mules were not entirely 
new to the Canadian army, which had some experience using them 
in Sicily and Italy). Ground lines of communication were highly 
vulnerable to enemy disruption, so all troops, regardless of trade, 
had to be trained and ready to fight in defensive roles. The enemy’s 
lines of communication were equally vulnerable, and therefore units 
57  Consolidated SEAC Report.
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had to be ready to exploit opportunities. As Major H.D.P. Tighe 
reported from the 53rd Indian Infantry Brigade, “it is now an almost 
automatic drill that whenever and wherever we come into contact 
with a main pos[itio]n of the enemy[,] a force [of ours] ranging from 
a co[mpan]y to a b[riga]de is sent around to a flank to get in the 
rear of the enemy and sit astride his L[ine] of C[ommunication].” 
Major C.P. Keely reported from the 25th Indian Division that, during 
rest periods, units spent much time practicing “watermanship”, a 
matter of considerable importance because of the strong, tidally-
influenced river currents that made loaded watercraft difficult to 
handle. Watermanship training included teaching all soldiers to 
swim, learning how to handle boats and outboard motors, practicing 
improvised crossing of water obstacles, and—probably new and 
unusual to most Canadians—“teaching mules to swim and practicing 
loading, transporting and unloading mules from all types of craft.” 
The Digest included as appendices ten detailed reports submitted by 
individual officers, providing readers the opportunity to delve deeper 
into particular operations or planning considerations of interest.58  
In December 1944, near the end of the observers’ mission to 
South East Asia Command, Spencer assembled the men in New 
Delhi to gather input for a consolidated report that must also have 
been informative for planning a Canadian deployment to the Pacific 
theatre.59 With information gleaned from nearly two-dozen officers, 
the report provided a wealth of information on fighting the Japanese 
in jungle conditions, from a distinctly Canadian army perspective. 
For example, a section on training listed competencies that the army 
needed to consider, including a thorough knowledge of Japanese tactics 
and habits, a high standard of “junglecraft”, and an appreciation that 
all operations must be anchored by firm bases employing “all around 
defences.”  The report emphasized that there were no rear areas in 
jungle warfare and therefore all soldiers, regardless of corps, must 
be trained to fight. The authors estimated that the army needed at 
least two months to train soldiers for jungle warfare, if they already 
had battle experience, and at least three months if they did not. 
They also recommended specific training subjects for each of the 
58  DHH, 171.009 (D55), CMHQ Far Eastern Warfare Digest No. 3, 22 February 
1945.
59  DHH, Robert H. Farquharson fonds, box 3, Major-General Spencer file, Spencer 
to Farquharson, 10 July 2001.
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armoured, artillery, and engineer corps. And, because of the heavy 
reliance on aerial photography in jungle operations, all officers down 
to company-command level, plus all intelligence officers, required a 
course on air photographic interpretation.60
The report also provided much valuable information on more 
mundane, but still quite important, planning considerations. All 
Army Service Corps officers required training in the employment of 
animal transport and porters. The authors even included examples 
of detailed mule loading tables. Animal management required 
special training in grooming and clipping, the treatment of diseases 
and minor injuries, saddlery and saddling, and, of course, march 
discipline. All soldiers required instruction on anti-malarial and anti-
scrub typhus precautions, and on first-aid for jungle conditions where 
heat and sanitation issues posed serious threats. The authors also 
strongly emphasized the importance of implementing troop welfare 
arrangements. The stress and feelings of isolation that are so much a 
part of prolonged jungle operations called for “an organization which 
endeavours to reproduce the comforts of home.”  Therefore, rest and 
leave centres should be run by Canadian agencies, and canteens 
should stock Canadian supplies, not the inferior and costly local stuff 
that could be difficult to procure. Keeping the troops informed was 
also of great importance, so the authors advised that production of 
a daily news sheet for distribution to all units “is considered to be 
most important.”61 
Greater detail on most lessons could be found in the individual 
observer reports. Of course, basic military wisdom holds that there is 
much benefit in learning from others’ hard-won lessons and, in this 
regard, the individual reports provided important lessons the allies 
had learned through their own hard experience. For example, few 
things were more important than sanitation, health, and hygiene in 
South East Asia.62 Anything less than the most rigorous standards 
in health and cleanliness resulted in “dyhorrea, dysentery, disease—
and alarming casualties.” Routine administrative matters like latrine 
construction merited close attention, and related details, such as 
fly-proofing measures and periodic cleansing by burning oil, were 
critically important. Similarly, the malaria threat demanded that the 
60  Consolidated SEAC Report.
61  Ibid.
62  DHH, 171.009 (D55), Captain M.N. Bow, Second Report, 20 August 1944.
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chain of command ruthlessly enforce anti-malaria regimes. Captain 
M.N. Bow reported while on attachment with the 6th Battalion, 
Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry, that “[w]hole 
b[attalio]ns have had to be moved to rest areas from the front line 
because of unduly high disease casualties.”63 The observers reported 
on innovative combat techniques too. For example, British forces 
learned to trap Japanese soldiers in their bunkers with artillery fire 
long enough for aircraft to bomb the structures.64
The Canadian observers gradually formed a cadre that the army 
was determined to use to help prepare forces for operations in the 
Pacific. In October 1944, the general staff ruled that the Canadian-
based officers, who had been in the first group attached to Australian, 
New Zealand, and American forces, would not be permitted to deploy 
to Europe.65 The general staff informed Pacific Command that “It 
has been decided [that] in view of the fact that these Officers have 
63  Ibid., Captain M.N. Bow, Third Report, 15 October 1944.
64  Ibid., Major C.V.B. Corbet, Report on attachment to SEAC, 22 December 1944.
65  DHH, 322.009 (D51), Brigadier A.C. Spencer to GOC-in-C Pacific Command, 27 
October 1944.
New Guinea, August 1942. Australian soldiers washing and boiling their uniforms. As the 
Canadian observers learned from the allies, rigorous sanitation, health and hygiene measures 
were vital to an army’s effectiveness in the tropical environment. [Australian War Memorial 026351]
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received valuable experience in methods of warfare used in that area 
[the Pacific theatre], their knowledge could at present be utilized 
to better advantage in Canada than overseas.” Pacific Command 
was to employ them appropriately, preferably as instructors in home 
defence units or in training establishments. Similarly, the officers on 
attachment to South East Asia Command, who had been drawn from 
the Canadian Army Overseas, returned to Canada as instructors, 
although five who had been staff-trained first completed an 
attachment to Canadian forces in Northwest Europe.66 Lieutenant-
Colonel Spencer, for example, deployed to Belgium immediately after 
his tour in South East Asia Command, but, by May 1945, he was 
back in Canada, serving as a staff officer in the newly established 
Canadian Army Pacific Force (CAPF), which had started assembling 
in Brockville, Ontario.67 
In June 1945, the army counted those who had served with 
Commonwealth or American forces in the Asia-Pacific region and 
ascertained that there were at least ninety-five such officers, including 
sixty-two with regimental experience and thirty-three with staff 
experience.68 Of these, records show that eighty-eight came from the 
observer program. The rest were officers who had deployed to the 
Pacific for other, individual reasons. Adding to the cadre of officers 
with expertise in the fight against Japan were at least twenty soldiers 
who had attended American, Australian, and British staff courses 
related to the Pacific theatre. The army deemed that all these officers 
comprised a “nucleus” of personnel available to assist in training and 
preparing a contingent for service in the Pacific. Table 1 depicts all 
observer deployments that occurred over the program’s duration.
building the canadian army pacific force 
In mid-May 1945, with Germany’s surrender only a few days old, the 
Canadian army started to build a ground force for operations against 
Japan, a campaign that  Canada and its allies predicted would last 
66  AHQ Report No. 16.
67  DHH, Robert H. Farquharson fonds, box 3, Spencer to Farquharson, 20 November 
2001.
68  AHQ Report No. 16.
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another eighteen months.69 At that time, Canada and the US reached 
a final agreement that the Canadian army contribution would 
comprise an infantry division, reinforced with a tank battalion.70 The 
force would organize itself on the pattern of the US Army and would 
use American equipment, but not American uniforms. It would also 
be sustained with American logistics services. And, before deploying, 
69  The US and Britain agreed during the Octagon Conference that they would seek 
to conclude the war with Japan within eighteen months of Germany’s defeat. LAC, 
RG24, volume 20324, Record of Proceedings for the Quebec Conference (September 
1944), 81. In late February 1945, Churchill advised King that the major allies had 
agreed during discussions at Malta and Yalta that the planning date for the end of 
the war against Japan was eighteen months after Germany surrendered. LAC, RG 
24, volume 20324, 951.023 (D13) Malta and Yalta Discussions 1945, Churchill to 
King, 27 February 1945.
70  AHQ Report No. 16. Provision of the tank battalion listed in DHH 112.3M2009 
(D79), CGS memorandum: Mobilization Plans—Pacific Force, 24 May 1945.
Table 1. Observer Depoloyments
Attachments to American Forces (Pacific Theatre)
10 officers February 1944, individuals deployed for up to eleven months 
(Mariana Islands, Saipan, and South West Pacific Area)
10 officers February 1945, for approximately three months (Philippines) 
10 officers February 1945, for approximately three months (Okinawa)
10 officers February 1945, for approximately three months (Okinawa)
5 officers May 1945, for approximately three months (Okinawa)
10 officers June 1945, for approximately three months (Okinawa)
Attachments to Australian Forces (Pacific Theatre)
8 officers March 1944 – November 1944 (South West Pacific Area; 
these officers joined US forces in September for the Morotai 
expedition)
Attachments to New Zealand Forces (Pacific Theatre)
2 officers March 1944 (South West Pacific Area; in August 1944, 
these officers joined the group with Australian forces)
Attachments to British Forces (Pacific Theatre)
20 officers July 1944 – January 1945 (India and Burma)
2 officers August 1944 – January 1945 (India and Burma)
1 officers November 1944 – April 1945 (India and Burma)
Source: Adapted from AHQ Report No. 16.
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the contingent would train in the US under American supervision. 
All told, the force was to include 30,000 troops, including a pool 
of 9,000 reinforcements that would provide three-months’ worth 
of replacements, based on American wastage rates.71 To fill the 
contingent’s ranks, the army sought trained and experienced 
volunteers. The general staff hoped to draw most of them from 
the battle-hardened units in Europe, with the incentive that those 
accepted to the new force would have the highest priority for return 
to Canada, where they would receive thirty days of leave. Meanwhile, 
the army immediately dispatched a group of planners to Washington 
to work with the War Department in integrating the Canadian force. 
Colonel W.A. Bean, one of the officers with operational experience 
in the Pacific (but not with the observer program), led the team.72 
In late July 1945, Bean submitted to National Defence Headquarters 
(NDHQ) a draft plan that proposed in detail how the contingent 
should be organized, trained, and maintained before deployment, 
how it should be maintained in theatre, and how reinforcements 
should be trained and pushed forward.73
The contingent quickly began to take shape during the late 
spring of 1945. The infantry division took on the title 6th Canadian 
Division and, in June, the ground force officially became the Canadian 
Army Pacific Force (CAPF). The CAPF commander-designate, 
Major-General Bert Hoffmeister, who had been commanding the 
5th Canadian Armoured Division since March 1944, first in Italy 
and then in Northwest Europe, landed in Ottawa on 13 June and 
immediately set to work with his key staff. Meanwhile, the army 
made plans to send 200 officers and 1,200 non-commissioned officers 
to the US for training on American weapons, so that they could in 
turn act as an instructional cadre for the rest of the CAPF when it 
71  DHH, 112.3M2009 (D79), CGS memorandum:  Mobilization Plans—Pacific Force, 
24 May 1945.
72  Ibid.  Bean graduated from the US Army Staff College in April 1944, where he 
had impressed the Commandant enough to earn a recommendation to serve with an 
American joint command for a six-month stint, which Canada permitted. Starting 
in June 1944, Bean served with American forces in the Southwest Pacific and was 
with the 1st US Marine Division during its assault in September on Peleliu Island, 
east of the Philippines.  DHH, 314.009 (D51) Cdn Army Observers (May 43-Nov 44), 
Colonel A.J. McFarland (Secretary to the US Joint Chiefs of Staff) to Pope, 13 May 
1944, and McFarland to Pope, 20 June 1944.
73  DHH, 112.3M2009 (D79), Canadian Planning Team Draft Outline Plan, 28 July 
1945.
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arrived stateside.74 By late June, a CAPF training plan was in place. 
The regime would start in mid-July, when soldiers reported for duty 
at nine locations across Canada.  At these locations they would learn 
about the enemy and commence training on American weapons. Then, 
the entire force would assemble at Camp Breckinridge in Kentucky 
74  Douglas E. Delaney, The Soldiers’ General: Bert Hoffmeister at War (Vancouver, 
UBC Press: 2005), 222-23.
Major-General Bert M. Hoffmeister, who had commanded the 5th Canadian Armoured 
Division in Europe, took command of the Canadian Army Pacific Force in June 1945. [© 
Government of Canada. Reproduced with the permission of Library and Archives Canada (2018). Source: 
Library and Archives Canada/Department of National Defence fonds/e010786512]
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for training that would progress from the individual to divisional 
level.75 All training was to be complete by mid-December.76
As planned, the 6th Canadian Division was constructed on the 
model of a standard US infantry division. The CAPF respected 
American practices of employing certain ranks at certain levels 
of command. So, an infantry “regiment” (or brigade in Canadian 
parlance) would generally be commanded by a colonel instead of 
a brigadier (although the first designated regimental commanders 
75  AHQ Report No. 16.
76  DHH, 112.3M2009 (D79), CGS Memorandum, Outline Plan for CAPF, 3 August 
1945.
In this staged photo, soldiers model the CAPF’s shoulder patch. [© Government of Canada. 
Reproduced with the permission of Library and Archives Canada (2018). Source: Library and Archives 
Canada/Department of National Defence fonds/e010750446]
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were all brigadiers). A company (or squadron or battery) could be 
commanded by a captain (as in the American practice) or a major.77 
Nomenclature for the division’s formations and units had to comply 
with American conventions too. Each regiment would have three 
numbered battalions (first, second, and third). Hoffmeister, who 
wanted to maintain some Canadian tradition, arranged to give each 
numbered battalion a regimental affiliation based on the 1st Canadian 
Infantry Division model. Therefore, the 1st Canadian Infantry 
Regiment would comprise the 1st Canadian Infantry Battalion (the 
Royal Canadian Regiment), the 2nd Canadian Infantry Battalion 
(the Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment), and the 3rd Canadian 
Infantry Battalion (the 48th Highlanders). This arrangement allowed 
the division to retain the regimental relationships that were a 
significant part of Canadian army culture. Meanwhile, commanders 
and staffs had to familiarize themselves with US staff procedure. In 
July, the Royal Military College in Kingston held a five-day orientation 
course for commanders and staffs on American staff procedure and 
organization. Another was planned for August.78
Efforts to raise the CAPF abruptly halted when, on 14 August, 
Japan surrendered unconditionally after the atomic bombings of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. For several weeks, all activity paused while 
the army waited to see if the peace would hold. By the end of the 
month though, it was clear that hostilities would not resume and the 
CAPF began to disband. It took until 10 October before all troops 
who had deployed to the US were back in Canada, and the army 
formally disbanded the CAPF’s units by 1 November.79
conclusion
In anticipation of the government decision to commit ground 
forces in the war against Japan, the Canadian army began to send 
officers to the Asia-Pacific region in early 1944 in order to observe 
the ongoing operations of Allied forces in the area. In all, eighty-
77  Ibid., CGS memorandum:  Mobilization Plans—Pacific Force, 24 May 1945. This 
directive allowed that brigadiers “may be used” to command a regiment and that the 
TO&E for company, squadron or battery command would reflect “captain or major”.
78  AHQ Report No. 16.
79  Ibid.
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eight soldiers eventually deployed, with explicit direction to gather 
information on the enemy and on how the allies trained and fought. 
These officers were part of a deliberate national effort to determine 
how, where, and with whom a Canadian division would deploy to the 
Pacific. Once the government decided in September 1944 to deploy 
a ground contingent with US forces in the Pacific, additional officers 
deployed on attachment to American fighting units and formations, 
not only to gain operational experience, but also to familiarize the 
Canadian army with American forces, equipment, and procedures. 
Ultimately, the observer program helped the army deal with two 
significant challenges: learning how to fight a largely unfamiliar 
enemy in a tropical environment as well as how to operate as part of 
an American force.
Although the war ended before the CAPF was able to deploy, 
the observer program has historical significance for several reasons. 
First, the deployment of officers to operational units fighting the 
Japanese constituted the Canadian army’s first step towards the 
contribution it hoped to make in the invasion of Japan. This first step 
included operational, often hazardous, duty by dozens of Canadian 
officers who joined allied forces and participated in hard-slogging 
campaigns in Burma and the Pacific region. The records consulted 
for this article show that several officers were wounded, but, more 
important was the useful information they sent back to Canadian 
military authorities. These officer’s reports informed the organization, 
training, equipment, and staffing of the CAPF in 1945. 
Second, the observer program constituted another sort of first 
step:  the beginning of the Canadian army’s close relationship 
with American forces. Canada’s close strategic defence relationship 
with its continental neighbour had only begun in earnest with the 
Ogdensburg Agreement (1940) that created the Permanent Joint 
Board of Defence and initiated collaboration on the defence of North 
America. But, notwithstanding contributions to the celebrated 
First Special Service Force and to the brief operation at Kiska, the 
Canadian army had not yet started to operate with American forces 
on any large scale. The plan to send a Canadian division to fight 
with American forces posed challenges for an army whose culture was 
rooted firmly in British traditions and practices. It forced Canadian 
military authorities to consider how a British-modeled formation from 
Canada could integrate into the American system. Adjusting to the 
American military was bound to be somewhat awkward, so attaching 
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officers to US forces on operations made good sense. Canadian army 
leadership was determined to make the integration succeed, and even 
rebuffed a British proposal, made to Ottawa shortly before the war 
in the Pacific ended, for the 6th Canadian Division to form part of 
an American-equipped British Commonwealth corps for the assault 
on Japan.80 
Finally, the observer program and the formation of the CAPF 
was, in the end, a step away from the imperial military family. 
Indeed, as Douglas Delaney shows, 1945 marked both the peak and 
the end of the “imperial army project” as Canada and her cousin 
dominions began to detach themselves from the British pole and 
gravitate towards the United States, ending four decades of close 
cooperation with the British army.81 Ultimately, the observer program 
resulted from sound and early political and military anticipation that 
Canada would have to define its role as an ally after Germany’s defeat. 
Indeed, the program was designed to enable the army to support 
the government’s policy of asserting Canada’s role in the world, by 
contributing substantively to allied operations against Japan after 
the defeat of Germany. Although Canada’s army did little fighting 
in the Asia-Pacific region, preparations were well underway to send 
30,000 volunteers to fight with the CAPF when the war ended, quite 
unexpectedly.
◆     ◆     ◆     ◆
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